This paper investigates how changes in regulatory and economic environments affect the transparency of banks' financial-statements. Reregulation and a volatile economy make Turkish banks the ideal sample. I disaggregate sources of both hidden and booked capital in Turkish banks traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange between 1988 and 2006. Hidden capital account for the difference between the accounting and opportunity-cost measures of a firm's net worth. Hidden capital increases in crisis periods which indicate a greater reliance on government-contributed safety-net capital. The increase in hidden capital is more pronounced for large banks. Too-Big-To-Fail policies may explain why large banks are the beneficiaries of government-contributed capital.
Introduction
This paper investigates how changes in regulatory and economic environments affect the transparency of financial statements. Financial statements are transparent only when stakeholders can access all relevant information to price financial institutions in a timely fashion (Kane, 2004; Viswanath and Kaufmann, 2001 ). Stakeholders of commercial banks are: shareholders who provide stock-capital, depositors and creditors who contribute debt-capital, borrowers who cultivate relationships with banks to meet financing needs, government regulators who enhance credit-worthiness of banks through implicit and explicit safety-nets, and taxpayers who may end up financing the safety nets.
Incentive conflicts between management, which prepares financial statements, and stakeholders, who rely on statements to accurately value firms, mean that management may misrepresent, conceal, and/or delay information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kane, 1989; Saunders et.al., 1990) . Kane (2004) defines financial disinformation as statements that are configured to hinder less-informed stakeholders from discerning the full-information value of an enterprise. Management propagates financial disinformation to delay dissemination of unfavorable information and discloses favorable information accurately and promptly. The asymmetry between the timeliness of favorable and unfavorable information means that sudden large downward movements in prices are more likely than upward movements. An economy-wide crisis is such a time when financial disinformation is revealed and there are large downward movements in prices.
Stakeholders learn of the depletion in shareholder-contributed capital when financial disinformation is revealed. This revelation necessitates new infusions of shareholder-capital and/or an increased reliance on implicit and explicit forms of government guarantees. The benefits accruing from implicit and explicit safety nets cannot be booked whereas capital raised from shareholders can be. Consequently, relying on government-contributed capital instead of raising capital from shareholders would decrease transparency. This paper tracks time-series changes in economic activity to investigate changes in transparency and sources of opaqueness in statements.
The Turkish banking industry provides a fruitful setting in which to investigate how changes in regulatory and economic environments affect the transparency of commercial banks. In the 1980s and 1990s, Turkish regulators passed a series of regulations that transformed how banks conducted business. (Ertuğrul and Selçuk, 2001; Alper and Öniş, 2003; Damar, 2004; Öniş and Bakır, 2007) . Turkish economy also proved volatile in the same period (Kibritçioğlu, 2001 ). This paper may also shed light on how the current subprime-mortgage crisis affects emerging-market countries. Emerging-market countries do not have as developed mortgage markets and their banks do not use securitization as much as banks in the US or Western Europe do. As such, securitization and mortgage-backed securities should not pose the same problems in emerging markets as they do in US and developed markets.
However, greater integration in the world economy, the slowing of the world economy and the credit crunch is affecting emerging-market countries that need to finance their growth. The sub-prime mortgage crisis has caught banks and borrowers of emerging markets with short positions in foreign currencies and a sizable need to roll-over. Net crises may enhance our understanding of how the current crisis affects emerging markets.
I adapt Kane's and Ünal's (1990) statistical market-value accounting model (SMVAM) to disaggregate sources of capital in Turkish banks traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) using data from 1988 to 2006. SMVAM uses regression analysis to partition the market value of a firm's stock into two components: booked capitalreserves and unbooked (or hidden) capital. Hidden capital accounts for the difference between the accounting and market-value measures of a firm's net worth. Hidden capital is divided into two parts. The first part consists of the values that are unbooked but which might be registered through asset sales and subsequent write-downs in a historical-cost balance sheet using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The second part comprises the values that are unbooked and which GAAP deems to be intangible offbalance-sheet items.
Hidden capital proves to be a significant component of net worth. Furthermore, hidden capital is significantly larger in crisis periods than it is in non-crisis periods.
Heavier reliance on government-contributed capital prior and during periods of crisis may explain the significant surges in hidden capital. The largest four banks in the sample benefit from implicit government guarantees more than do the small banks. A policy of Too-Big-To-Fail, where the government is expected to not let large banks fail, increases shareholder wealth by decreasing financing costs (O'Hara and Shaw, 1990) . I conjecture that the four large banks were deemed Too-Big-To-Fail and enjoyed the benefits from implicit and explicit safety nets.
During the sample period, Turkish banks categorized foreign-currency related derivative transactions as off-balance-sheet transactions. Banks had the leeway to engage in these transactions without having to set aside shareholder-contributed capital. Short positions in foreign currencies attained using derivative products coupled with devaluation in the Turkish lira in crisis periods, such as in 1994 and 2001, might have generated a need for infusions of capital. Banks may raise capital from shareholders, or, in the form of heavier reliance on implicit and explicit safety nets from the government.
Results indicate a heavier reliance on government-provided capital in crisis periods. Furthermore, I find no significant increase in shareholder-contributed capital in crisis periods relative to non-crisis periods. Regulators instituted full deposit-insurance coverage following the crises in 1994 and 2001. The regulatory choice to increase government-provided guarantees points to a need for and a realization of increased reliance on government-provided capital.
The Turkish experience in the crises of 1994 and 2001 indicates that banks rely on government-contributed capital more than they do on shareholder-contributed capital.
One immediate response to crisis is to introduce full-deposit insurance to restore investor confidence. However, full-deposit insurance distorts the risk-taking incentives of banks and introduces moral hazard problems. Banks can increase the value derived from deposit insurance by increasing asset volatility (Merton, 1977) . Grossman (1992) shows how financial institutions covered by deposit insurance operating under relatively more permissive regulatory environments tend to carry out riskier lending than their more tightly regulated counterparts do. The introduction of blanket guarantees in the 1994 and 2001 crises indicates that Turkish regulators did not establish risk-sensitive, incentivecompatible safety nets. The cost of providing capital to unhealthy banks through implicit and explicit guarantees was ultimately borne by healthy banks and the Turkish taxpayer.
Reliance on government guarantees and Too-Big-to-Fail policies make financial statements opaque. Opaqueness in financial statements impairs the ability of regulators and taxpayers to distinguish between troubled and healthy banks. Kane (1997) explains how transparency is crucial in controlling incentive conflicts between regulators, regulated institutions, and taxpayers. Regulated institutions (such as the banks in our sample) have incentives to hide adverse information from regulators and the general public. Regulators, as self-interested agents that serve society and private sector interests, are often the targets of influence peddling from regulated institutions. This is why transparency of financial statements is vital for regulators to monitor regulated institutions and for taxpayers to evaluate the performance of regulators.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 1 develops the research design. Section 2 reports the results of the tests of hypotheses. Finally, Section 3 concludes the paper.
Research Design

Hypotheses and design of tests
I use SMVAM to operationalize transparency. Transparency of financial statements means that stakeholders (depositors, creditors, investors, regulators, taxpayers, borrowers, and bankers) can rely on statements to judge the health of banks.
In a perfectly transparent world, market value (the "true" economic value of the bank) would exactly coincide with book value. A stakeholder would work out the value of any bank by looking into its books.
SMVAM
1 develops separate estimates for the bookable and unbookable components of the market value of a banking firm. Market value of net worth (MV) is the product of share price and the number of shares outstanding. MV can also be thought 1 Kane and Ünal (1990) , Kane, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ünal (1991) , and Kane and Wilson (2002) Banks report some transactions that may affect net worth in footnotes that accompany the financial statements. These off-balance-sheet transactions include loan commitments, standby letters of credit, and foreign-currency-and interest-rate-related derivative contracts. The Turkish lira steadily depreciated against all foreign currencies as a result of persistent inflation in the last two decades. The volatility in the exchange rate has also been high. Any bank with large short-positions or long-positions in foreign currencies faced significant risk. This is why I introduce foreign-currency-related derivative contracts 2 into Equation 1.
where FX it is foreign-currency-related derivative transactions and k FX is the mark-up ratio investors apply to these transactions.
Cross-sectional differences in bank size and time-series differences in economic activity may affect estimates of SMVAM. First, bank size may affect the competitive environment and how regulatory authorities treat banks (O'Hara and Shaw, 1990; DeYoung et.al., 2004; Berger et.al., 2004) . As a result, SMVAM estimates of markup ratios and hidden capital may differ for small and large banks. Second, bank management has incentives to conceal and delay dissemination of adverse information. In financial crisis when accumulated adverse information is revealed, investors may value bank assets differently (Kane, 2001a; Kane, 2004) . This is why SMVAM estimates in crisis periods may differ from estimates in non-crisis periods.
I use the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) framework 3 to estimate SMVAM for large and small banks. Market capitalizations of small and large banks are regressed on their book values of assets, liabilities and foreign-exchange-related derivative transactions. Interaction terms between the variables and an indicator for large banks control for differences in estimates in normal times and times of crisis. I estimate the following system of equations using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS):
MV S,it = U S + k a,S * A S,it + k l,S * L S,it + k FX,S * FX S,it + U S,crisis * I crisis + k a,S, crisis * A S,it * I crisis + k l,S,crisis * L S,it * I crisis + k FX,S,crisis * FX S,it * I crisis + e S,it ,
[3]
I crisis is an indicator for crisis periods. The subscripts "S", "L", "S, crisis", and "L, crisis" stand for small banks, large banks, small banks in crisis periods, and large banks in crisis periods, respectively.
Hidden capital would not exist in a perfectly transparent world. In a sense, the extent to which unbooked equity (U) deviates from zero and the mark-up ratios (k) deviate from unity is an inverse measure of transparency. I expect some opaqueness in financial statements due to the leeway that GAAP grants managers in how they report bank activities. I test the following hypothesis of transparency for each group of banks:
Hypothesis 1: Financial statements are transparent.
(U n = 0 and k a,n = 1 and k l,n = -1, n = S, L in normal times U n + U n, crisis = 0 and k a,n + k a,n, crisis = 1 and k l,n + k a,n, crisis = -1, in times of crisis) I test our hypotheses that cross-sectional differences in bank size and time-series differences in economic activity may affect SMVAM estimates. First, I test whether banks raise capital either from shareholders or from the government in crisis periods. In times of financial crisis, managers cannot avoid/delay dissemination of adverse information. Revelation of adverse information lowers asset prices. Consequently, banks need to raise capital either from shareholders or from government regulators. 
,crisis in times of crisis)
The choice of Turkish banks
Reregulation and a volatile economy make Turkish banks ideal to investigate how changes in regulation and economic environment affect transparency of financial institutions. I first summarize the regulatory changes that alter the operation of Turkish commercial banks in the sample period. I then discuss the economic environment.
In the early 1980s, financial liberalization caused major structural changes in the Turkish economy 4 . Before financial liberalization, Turkey followed a strict, domesticmarket-oriented, high-tariff-protected development strategy. In accordance with this strategy, the government determined interest rates. Regulation imposed high entry and exit costs. Development plans defined the objective of financial institutions as raising capital needed for investment in "high-priority" industries. Starting in 1980, the administration adopted a new development strategy based on "free market" notions of competition. As a result of financial liberalization, banks were able to set interest rates on deposits they attracted and on the credit they supplied. for the largest four banks is 7,909 million YTL whereas it is 688 million YTL for the remaining banks. In the analysis, SVMAM estimates of these large four banks will be allowed to differ from the estimates of small banks.
I adopt the metric Kibritçioğlu (2001) develops to identify crisis periods in the
Turkish economy. The author constructs an index of macroeconomic crisis using indices of real industrial production, monthly inflation, and exchange rate. I generate an indicator of macroeconomic crisis that takes on the value one in the years 1988, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1999, and 2001 , and zero in all other years.
Results
I estimate the system of equations represented in Equation 3 using FGLS. I allow for heteroscedasticity in variances of small and large banks 14 . Table 3 reports the results of this regression. Observations in the sample are annual until the end of 1996 and are quarterly after 1996. This is why I estimate the system of equations using the full sample (the first column of Table 3 reports Differences in regulation and institutional structure of the ISE in the two periods (1988-1996 and 1997-2006 ) affect the analysis. Market value of net worth is the measure of "true" economic value. Markets must price stocks efficiently for market value of net worth to reflect true economic value. The Turkish stock market is relatively young; it started operations in 1986. Balaban and Kunter (1997) and Antoniou et.al. (1997) find inefficiencies in the ISE using data from 1988 to 1995. Furthermore, Antoniou et.al. (1997) show that following institutional and regulatory changes, the ISE becomes more efficient in the latter part of their sample period. This is why one must be cautious in interpreting estimates of SMVAM in the subsample covering years from 1988 to 1996.
Equation 3 disaggregates the market value of net worth into its bookable and unbookable components. Mark-up ratios for assets, liabilities and foreign-currencyrelated derivative transactions (k a , k l , and k FX ) measure how investors mark up or down the value of these booked items. As expected asset and liability mark-up ratios prove 14 In the SUR framework, contemporaneous correlation across groups is possible if the groups have equal number of observations and share a common identifier (such as time or firm identity). In our sample, the groups are unbalanced in their number of observations. This is why we cannot allow for contemporaneous correlation across groups (Baum, 2006; STATA Press, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002) .
positive and negative, respectively, in all subsamples and bank groups except one. Asset mark-up ratio of small banks in non-crisis periods for the subsample covering the years 1988 to 2006 prove negative and insignificant. The small sample size and problems of market efficiency might explain the contradictory mark-up ratios in this subsample.
Markets capitalize one YTL of small-bank asset or liability at more than its book value in non-crisis periods and less than its book value in crisis periods. Results support the hypothesis that economic crisis forces revelation of adverse information about small banks. Consequently, investors mark-down the prices of small-bank assets and liabilities.
Markets judge one YTL of large-bank asset or liability at more than its book value in both non-crisis and crisis periods. In contrast to small banks, security prices of large 
Transparency of financial statements
The significance of hidden capital for large banks in crisis and non-crisis periods Table 5 investigates whether banks raise capital from shareholders more in crisis periods relative to non-crisis periods. I collect annual data on paid-in capital for the period of 1991 to 2006 from the Turkish Banking Association and increases in capital from rights issues for the whole sample period from the ISE. 15 Table 5 reports the means, the t-statistics and p-values for the tests of differences in means for paid-in capital, increases in paid-in capital and increases in capital from rights issues. Unfortunately, the ISE provides data on surviving banks only. There is, therefore, survivorship bias in the sample. The banks excluded went bankrupt precisely due to the depletion in their capital base and their inability to raise additional funds from shareholders. As such, the banks in our sample of rights issues are the ones who are more likely to have raised capital from their shareholders. Table 5 shows that paid-in capital decreases in crisis periods for both small and large banks. Results indicate that shareholders provide more capital in crisis periods since increases in paid-in capital and capital from rights issues prove higher in crisis periods than in non-crisis periods. However, the changes in both the level and flow of paid-in capital prove statistically insignificant. The survivorship bias in the rights issues sample indicates a narrower difference between capital raised in crisis and non-crisis periods. To sum up, the results provide no conclusive evidence that banks raise capital from shareholders to offset decreases in net worth in times of crisis.
15 TBB reports paid-in capital as "ödenmiş sermaye" and provides data on paid-in capital from 1991 onwards. Data on increases in capital from rights issues is available from Istanbul Stock Exchange at http://www.imkb.gov.tr/sirket/sermaye_temettu.htm. Increases in capital from rights issues is the sum of increases in capital from exercised pre-emptive rights and rights restricted to shareholders. Exercised preemptive rights and rights restricted to shareholders are respectively, "rüçhan hakkı kullandırılan bedelli artırımlar" and "rüçhan hakkı kısıtlanan bedelli artırımlar".
Impact of size on transparency and bank operations
Large and small banks may operate and book their operations in fundamentally different ways (DeYoung et.al., 2004; Berger et.al., 2004 ). DeYoung et.al. (2004 describe how deregulation and technological change reshaped the competitive environment for small and large banks in the US. The authors develop a simple model in which small and large banks differentiate unit costs and product mix to compete. The last two decades saw a similar change in the Turkish competitive environment induced by deregulation and technological change. This is why I control for bank size in estimating SMVAM.
Panel C of Table 4 investigates Hypothesis 3 which holds that small and large banks operate and book their operations in similar ways. Panel C reports -statistics and p-values for the test of equality in hidden capital and mark-up ratios for small and large banks. In the full sample and the subsample covering quarters from 1997 to 2006, largeand small-bank hidden capital proves significantly different. According to Kane (2001a) Too-Big-To-Fail policies enable creditors to depend on government to rescue large banks when and if large banks run into trouble. Our findings suggest that markets perceive the four-large banks to be benefiting from Too-Big-To-Fail policies. Panel C reports no significant difference between the mark-up ratios of small and large banks. Findings indicate that small and large banks record bookable assets and liabilities in similar ways.
The differences between small and large banks lie not in how they report their operations but in how regulators treat them. As put forth by the Too-Big-To-Fail hypothesis, large banks enjoy credit enhancements afforded by the Turkish government.
Mergers and changes in reporting standards
Reregulation in reporting standards and mergers may also affect the findings. (Cornett et.al., 2006) . This is why mergers may affect transparency of financial statements. This section discusses whether and how mergers and changes in regulation affect our analysis.
I interpreted the time-variation in estimates of hidden capital as evidence of the importance of government-provided capital in crisis periods. The change in accounting measures may also explain the higher hidden capital estimates in crisis periods if inflation accounting increases opaqueness. This does not seem to be the case since the stated purpose of the change in accounting standards was to make financial statements more transparent. However, I have no way of testing for the stand-alone effect of the change in accounting standards. Table 6 investigates whether and how mergers change results using an indicator 
Conclusion
The Table 4 
-Tests of hypotheses
Panels A through C report p-values and χ2 statistics for tests of Hypothesis 1 through 3, respectively. Panel A tests the hypothesis of transparent statements for small and large banks in non-crisis and crisis periods (In non-crisis periods: U k = 0 and k a,k = 1 and k l, k =-1. In crisis periods: U k + U k,crisis = 0 and k a,k + k a,k,crisis = 1 and k l, k + k l, k,crisis =-1 where k: L, S. The subscripts "L, "S" stand for large and small banks). Panel B tests whether the magnitude of hidden capital differs in crisis and non-crisis periods (U k, = U k,crisis where k : L, S.). Panel C tests whether SMVAM estimates of small and large banks differ (U S = U L , k a,S = k a,L and k l,S = k l,L in non-crisis periods. U S + U S,crisis = U L + U L,crisis , k a,S + k a,S,crisis = k a,L + k a,L,crisis and k l,S + k l,S,crisis = k l,L + k l,L,crisis in crisis periods.). SMVAM estimates are from 
